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METHOD IN CATHOLIC STUDIES
Msgr. Richard M. Liddy

In this article I will first highlight contemporary issues in Catholic Studies and emphasize the need
for method in addressing these issues. Basing ourselves on Bernard Lonergan‟s reflections on
method, we will point to a generalized empirical method at the basis of all methods both in the
natural and the historical sciences. Such a generalized empirical method allow for moral and
religious questions. Reflections on the development and differentiation of methods open up to a
dialectical method that can address fundamental conflicts in Catholic Studies. It is also helpful in
distinguishing Catholic Studies as religious studies and as theology. Lonergan‟s Method in
Theology highlighted the importance of an evaluative or dialectical method in approaching issues
of conflict in theology. It can also be helpful in shedding light on method in Catholic Studies.
Finally, on this basis we will highlight the role of the method of “praxis” in Catholic Studies, that is,
as concretely influencing the development of the human sciences and the humanities.
1. Issues in Catholic Studies
During the last twenty years Catholic Studies has emerged as a new specialization within the
academy. It has naturally emerged in Catholic universities, but it has also emerged within other
public and secular universities as well.1 In recent years the Curran Center for American Catholic
Studies at Fordham University has sponsored a number of conferences bringing together people
interested in Catholic Studies. At a meeting in December, 2005, some of the issues raised about the
present situation of Catholic Studies in the United States were the following:
A “triumphalist” reading of Catholic Studies as opposed to a more honest historical
presentation;
The relation of Catholic Studies to religious studies: is Catholic Studies a sub-section of
religious studies?
Does Catholic Studies imply theology? In what sense?
The role of exigent historical study in Catholic Studies and the possible interference of
theological concerns in historical research;
The role of spiritual and moral “formation” in Catholic Studies programs; is there a role?
Should there be?
The “political” dimension of Catholic Studies: Who is sponsoring them? For what reasons?
Conservative? “Restorationist?”
Whose “Catholicism” are we talking about? That of whites? Males? The first world? The
marginalized?
In addition to the above issues which surfaced at the Fordham meeting, other issues were broached
in the Winter 2007 volume of Listening: Journal of Religion and Culture sponsored by Lewis
University:
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The “public” character of Catholicism and Catholic Studies‟ possible influence on public
policy, especially with regard to the poor and the marginalized: Should Catholic Studies aim
at having such influence?
The role of Catholic theology and Catholic studies in the human sciences: psychology,
sociology, economics: Should it have such a role?
Catholicism and the professions: Is there a role for Catholic Studies in relation to the various
professions?
Further questions with regard to Catholic Studies can be highlighted, for example, the relationship
between Catholicism and other religious traditions in the contemporary world. What is the official
church saying? What are Catholic theologians saying? What is happening on the ground?
And to all of these issues can be added the one symbolized by the recent attack on all religion by
prominent figures in contemporary culture: Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris and
Christopher Hitchens.2 Such attacks raise fundamental methodological issues: for example, can one
be a Catholic and nonetheless do exigent historical and scientific work on Catholicism? More
broadly, can one be religious and still do scientific work in the field of religious studies? Does
commitment to a religion interfere with objectivity? Can one be objective about one‟s own religion,
one‟s own Catholicism, about another‟s religion?
Or, on the opposite side, can one be totally “tone deaf” to religion and at the same time write
meaningfully on religious concerns? In other words, would a Catholic researcher always be
compelled to give the best possible interpretation of “things Catholic” - the Spanish Inquisition, for
example? Or would a non-religious researcher be forced to give the most secular interpretation
possible to “things Catholic,” Saint Francis of Assisi, for example? In the following sections we
will treat of these questions employing the resources of Bernard Lonergan‟s reflections on
methodology.

4
2. Catholic Studies as Religious Studies and as Theology
A major distinction that has to be made from the beginning and one that can help us treat the issues
mentioned above in regard to Catholic Studies is the distinction between theology and religious
studies. These are two related but distinct disciplines. For religious studies primarily concerns
religious phenomena and symbols wherever they may be found in their this-worldly aspects.
Religious studies and theology are not identical but distinct. The theologies tend to
be as many and diverse as the religious convictions they express and represent. In
contrast, religious studies envisage all religions and, so far from endeavoring to
arbitrate between opposing religious convictions, commonly prefer to describe and
understand their rituals and symbols, their origins and distribution, their history and
influence.3
Religious studies, then, confines its attention to religious phenomena and religious symbols in their
this-worldly aspects.
It is the singularity of religious symbols that gives rise to the distinction between
religious studies and theology. For religious studies leave to theology questions
concerned with what is believed to be more than man, what is not of this world.
They confine their attention, as does the whole of modern science, to what is
within this world, to the things man experiences, and even to human experiencing
itself. Nor is there any doubt in my opinion, about the general soundness of this
restriction...4
Both religious studies and contemporary theology are rooted in history, but theology takes seriously
the claim that these religious phenomena purport to deal with what goes beyond history. “The
theologies endeavor to discern whether there is any real fire behind the smoke of symbols employed
in this or that religion.”5 Religions commonly purport to relate people to what goes beyond this
world, a relation often termed “faith.”6 Such faith finds expression in historical beliefs. Theology
deals with the validity of such beliefs and their current formulation. Theology asks such questions
as:
What is the real nature of this relation to the beyond?
Do theological beliefs reflect authentic faith or are they contaminated by ideology,
partisanship, blindness, shortsightedness?
With regard to Catholicism, a religion that is rooted in faith and in the belief that God has truly
revealed himself to humanity, theology asks such questions as,
Have we gotten it right? Have we heard God‟s word rightly?
What precisely has God truly revealed to humanity and how has that self-revelation been
received by historical humanity? Have we heard God‟s Word correctly or has our historical
hearing been contaminated by historically and culturally conditioned biases?
What is the role of the church in such reception and passing on of divine revelation?
What is the role of the Catholic church, her sacraments, structures and beliefs?
How is divine revelation being received by the Church today?
How is the Catholic Church related to other Christian churches in their reception of divine
revelation today?
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How is such a revelation related to the rest of human living today? What is its essence? Its
core?
How communicate it effectively to people of today?
What questions arising out of human life today impact our hearing of God‟s self-revelation?
To the extent that theology takes into account other religions, it can be seen as a species of religious
studies. This has become particularly significant for Catholic theology since Vatican II with its
concern to relate Catholicism to other Christian groups, other religions and even to non-believers.
Such a fact requires the theologian to reflect on his religion, not in isolation from all others, but in
conjunction with others. Commenting in 1974 on the relation of religious studies to theology,
Lonergan says:
A third major influence is the field of religious studies: the phenomenology of
religion, the psychology of religion, the sociology of religion, the history of
religions, and the philosophy of religion. I call this a major influence, not because
the influence has been conspicuous, but because of very significant and powerful
contemporary trends. The first stems from Vatican II, and it consists in the
Church‟s concern with ecumenism, with non-Christian religions, and with the
atheist negation of religion. This fact requires the theologian to reflect on his
religion, not in isolation from all others, but in conjunction with others. It
requires him to attend, not only to the differences separating his religion from
others, but also to the similarities that connect them with one another. To meet
such requirements theology will be led into the field of religious studies, and,
indeed, while retaining its identity, to conceive itself as a particular type of
religious studies.7 [Don‟t quote this but spell this out discursively]
Religious studies culminates in a philosophy of religion, that is, a study of how it is possible that
religions commonly purport to deal with what transcends this world? In other words philosophy of
religion deals with the validity of the question of God and the conditions for the possibility of
religious experience and religious belief.
On the other hand, since theologies express in the context of the times an orientation to the
transcendent, they can be powerful. Arnold Toynbee once captured this power of theology:
There is, indeed, no limit to the commitment incurred by the inquirer who ventures
to be a student of human affairs, for, whether he has foreseen this or not, he has
committed himself, in the act, to becoming a theologian too. In consternation he
may try to beat a retreat from this perilously exposed position into the dead ground
of 'comparative religion,' in the hope that he can escape from theology under the
scientific camouflage of anthropological research. But theology is an incubus that a
humanist can never shake off. He may seek refuge from theism in atheism or from
animism in materialism. But after each desperate twist and turn he will find himself
committed to some theological position or other. Theology is inescapable, and it is
dynamite. It will betray its identity through the camouflage by exploding in the
end.8
It is because of this potential power of theology that it is all the more important to be careful of
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theology. It would seem that we cannot get away from theology or theologizing, for we tend to
claim the truth of our beliefs, even when our theology is the truth-claim is that there is nothing
beyond this world. But is this not all the more reason for being careful in our theologizing and not
claiming that we know more than we do?9 If, as someone once said, theology is “truth-claimology,”
is it not incumbent upon us to show how our beliefs at least “make sense” and are historically
grounded? in this case in the Scriptures and the tradition of the church?
Theology and religious studies need each other. Without theology religious
studies may indeed discern when and where different religious symbols are
equivalent; but they are borrowing the techniques of theologians if they attempt to
say what the equivalent symbols literally mean and what they literally imply.
Conversely, without religious studies theologians are unacquainted with the
religions of mankind; they may as theologians have a good grasp of the history of
their own religion; but they are borrowing the techniques of the historian of
religions, when they attempt to compare and relate other religions with their
own." (164)
Religious studies seem, then, to be located on the more historical side of the equation. Theology
adds another step, the element of commitment: the element of asserting what particular religious
symbols mean in relation to the transcendent. Religious studies can lay out the historical scene:
theology reflects on a particular religion‟s transcendent claims.
Ultimately those claims can be linked to particular social, cultural and political issues. Thus, James
Fisher expects that studies of Catholicism should have an effect on the larger life of society.
Is Catholic Studies well-positioned to address the growing desire for attentiveness to
the religious dimension in public as well as academic life? Roman Catholicism
offers not only a “holistic” vision” but a deep tradition of engagement with the
human person in all dimensions. Catholicism in America has been “different:” can it
come to terms with other “differences,” such as in the area of sexuality or
cognitive/physical disabilities.10 (Jim Fisher – check this quote)
Such an effect, it would seem, depends not just on comparative historical knowledge, but also on
inner religious conviction finding expression in beliefs and practical implications. Of course, this
whole process from historical religious studies can be studied from a purely religious studies point
of view that, for example, would study the conflict of theologies that led up to the Second Vatican
Council and the conflict of Catholic theologies that have emerged in the Catholic Church after the
Second Vatican Council. [cf. Kerr‟s book] It is when one makes a decisive option among these
various possibilities that one enters the realm of existential theology, doctrines to which one
adheres, a systematic outline and a pastoral communication to others.
As perhaps is obvious from these reflections, this is a shifting field. Religious studies, solidly
grounded in historical studies, seems at first sight to be obvious and easily identifiable. Theology,
on the other hand, seems much more diffuse. Seemingly diffuse though it may seem, however, it
can be powerful. It taps into an orientation to the beyond. That orientation, as Toynbee‟s quote
above brings out, can at times be identified with the totally secular, the totally this-worldly. On the
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other hand, it can be identified with a fundamentalist identification with a particular religious
expression. Or it can be identified with Teilhard de Chardin‟s belief in the orientation of the whoe
universe toward the Omega Point that is Christ. Bernard Lonergan‟s main point would be that we
test all these horizons, discern what is authentic, reject what is unauthentic and hold onto what is
good. (Scripture quote)
The ideal it would seem would be a symbiosis of historical religious studies and authentic theology.
My first conclusion is that the more religious studies and theology put to good use
the whole battery of methods, the more they will move asymptotically towards an
ideal situation in which they overlap and become easily interchangeable. As a
second conclusion I would say that such overlapping and interchangeability are ideal
in the sense that they are desirable.11
Catholic Studies, then, could be seen as a species of religious studies, but it can also be seen as
linked to Catholic theology, that is, those disciplines that endeavor to say “what the symbols literally
mean.” In terms of Lonergan‟s functional specialties, Catholic Studies can be seen not only as
historical study, but also as linked to the foundations of Christian thought, Catholic doctrine and
Catholic systematic theology.
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3. Method as Generalized Empirical Method
To have a method is to have an instrument for cutting through the jungle of entanglements
involved in separating all the pieces implied in the above questions. Only a methodical approach
can help separate the pieces. Only a methodical approach can cut through the maze of issues,
help make the necessary distinctions and shed light on the whole list of issues.
For what is method? Essentially method is doing things the right way so that you can get
somewhere. Nor, as we will see, is a methodical approach mechanical – like “The New Method
Laundry;” rather, it basically consists in following the built-in laws of the human spirit so as to
achieve cumulative and progressive results. As Bernard Lonergan defines method:
Method is patterned set of operations linked to each other in a such a way as to
achieve cumulative and progressive results.
All the above issues can be handled from the point of view of “method:”
a. Method as personal creative intelligence – socialized b. Especially the generalized empirical method that takes not just the data of sense
but the data of consciousness seriously – reality is not “a blob out there” =
Lonergan
c. That gets you beyond empirical science as the one and only method, criterion of
truth – and opens you out to intellectual, moral and religious values in history
d. And exposes the biases that so easily infect intelligence: psychological,
individual, group and general…
e. Especially group bias (prejudice, triumphalism)
f. And general bias: freezes intelligence before the moral and ethical, the existence
and goodness of Intelligence in history and the claims of religion - cf. the article
“The Subject”
g. So the basic issue with Dawkins and Dennett is methodological
The mind ranges to and fro, and spreads out, and advances forward with a
quickness which has become a proverb, and a subtlety and versatility which baffle
investigation. It passes on from one point to point, gaining one by some
indication; another on a probability; then availing itself of an association; then
falling back on some received law; next seizing on testimony; then committing
itself to some popular impression, or some inward instinct, or some obscure
memory; and thus it makes progress not unlike a clamberer on a steep cliff, who,
by quick eye, prompt hand, and firm foot, ascends how he knows not himself, by
personal endowments and by practice, rather than by rule, leaving no track
behind him, and unable to teach another. It is not too much to say that the
stepping by which great geniuses scale the mountains of truth is as unsafe and
precarious to men in general, as the ascent of a skillful mountaineer up a literal
crag. It is a way which they alone can take; and its justification lies in their
success. And such mainly is the way in which all men, gifted or not gifted,
reason, - not by rule, but by an inward faculty. (J.H. Newman, “Implicit and
Explicit Reason,” in Oxford University Sermons (uniform edition), 252-253.)
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Newman‟s quote on the dynamic character of the human mind sets the stage for our reflections
on method; for method is but the expression of the dynamism built into the human spirit: its
creativity, its flexibility, its persistence. Newman himself catalogued this dynamism in his
Grammar of Assent where he described the mental processes by which the human mind reaches
assent. In other words, he was reaching out beyond own native genius to express in a formal
way the common characteristics of all instances of successful mental functioning. In other
words, by his very writing he was testing his own grasp of the character of the human mind
within the court of public opinion. Though intimately personal, his practice expressed itself
socially. Challenging other philosophical views on the mind, he set out those other views and
then contrasted them with his own. In fact, it was said of Newman that a veritable “grammar of
skepticism” could be compiled from his writings, so adept was he at honestly presenting his
opponents‟ views.
Similarly, the point of method in any area is to get us beyond a biased self-centered point of view
to a more communal and social apprehension of things and to use that apprehension to help
others perform successfully.
It remains the high privilege of method to raise the stature of individuals by
making them members of a scientific community and so compensating for the
weakness of any by the presence, the aid, the challenge of others. So the gifts of
each become the leaven of the whole mass and, while this leavening process
works its effects insensibly at any time, still over time it is not difficult to
document its cumulative impact.12
So method in Catholic Studies can help us transcend the triumphalist tendencies and group biases
mentioned above in order to arrive at a more universally open and authentic view of things. It
can insolate us against bias and help us be open to all that is genuinely authentic. As the Greek
roots of the word, meta (“according to”) and hodos (path) indicate, method means taking the
right path, that is, the most authentic path. So the issue of method becomes the issue of
authenticity, that is, dedication to such transcendental notions as meaning, intelligibility, truth,
goodness, value and genuine love. (the pure desire to know…)
For we have above recounted at some length some of the issues and conflicts that affect Catholic
Studies. To take one of the more neuralgic ones, how is Catholic Studies to face Richard
Dawkins‟ interpretation of modern science that sees it as absolutely antithetical not only to
Catholicism but to all religion? Is not the issue here one of method? The correct method, not just
for doing science, but for evaluating scientific method in relation to other methods?
Lonergan in Insight: A Study of Human Understanding illustrates the basic human method at the
basis of scientific method. It is failure to adhere to that basic human method that was responsible
for
the
overlay
of
materialist
interpretations
of
science
from
Galileo down to Richard Dawkins.
Such authenticity is opposed to an implicit materialism that considers reality a “blob out
there” to be arrived at by taking a good look without understanding or making distinctions. One
becomes the captive of the latest “bright idea” without genuine understanding or refined
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judgment. One is content with a view of reality as “out there to be looked at or intuited” without
doing the work of understanding and judgment. Even religious people are liable to such an
implicit materialism as one considers even transcendent realities according to a materialist mindset.13 (E.I. Watkin)
Consequently, one way to speak of method in Catholic Studies is to speak of the role of
conversion in Catholic Studies: intellectual, moral and religious conversion. [cf Method in
Theology] There is a specific human development needed to handle the methodological issues
raised by the emerging field of Catholic Studies. Bernard Lonergan often used the phrase
“intellectual conversion” as shorthand for his methodological project.14 In other words, genuine
self-appropriation, genuine knowledge of what is going on within us as we engage in science and
scholarship amounts to a conversion, a radical change on the intellectual level: a move from even
an implicit materialism to a critically realist philosophy of the world: reality is attained not just
by experience, but by penetrating understanding and refined judgment. One reaches the world,
not by giving in to bias, but by understanding, by making distinctions, by refined judgment.
Reality is not some kind of a “blob out there” but rather the endlessly varied intelligibility of the
world to be known by refined understanding and true judgment.
In human affairs such a conversion has profound social implications: it involves a recognition of
the structure of the human good: an acknowledgement of not just particular goods but also the
good of order which “at the cost of limited restrictions makes available an abundance of
particular goods;” it also implies that there are values and a scale of value as the correlative of
rational choice. Such intellectual conversion inoculates us against bias: not just the individual
bias called selfishness or egoism, but also group bias or prejudice. Such bias is evident in the
references above to European triumphalism or male triumphalism or even the Catholic
triumphalism. “My country right or wrong but my country” can become “my religion right or
wrong but my religion.”
So Lonergan‟s phrase “intellectual conversion,” especially evident in his Method in Theology,
highlights the issue of authenticity. It calls for a conversion from group bias and prejudice to
authentic thinking and judging – and dependence on an inwardly known and appropriated
criterion of authentic understanding and judging. That is the basic issue: that is, an explicit
commitment to intelligence and where it leads, unencumbered by individual or group bias or by
any “general bias” which either implicitly or explicitly freezes or obscures the operations of
intellect.
Now intellectual conversion recognizes that intellect unfolds methodically: that is, in a
structured, step by step, discursive way. Sometimes it focuses on the specific, “more and more
about less and less” (the role of the Knights of Labor in the late 19th century) and sometimes it
withdraws from specifics to survey a wider scene (the role of theology in relation to historical
scholarship). (cf. quote on judgment about the woods and the forest). Sometimes it
methodically surveys one particular area and at other times it employs various differentiated
methods in order to achieve its objective of correct understanding.
The human reality known in this way is not a “blob” but rather social and valuational; ultimately
- pace Dennett and his friends - it is open to the question of the Intelligence grounding the

11
intelligibility of the world. Only by finding the criterion of reality, not in the world of
immediacy, but in the world mediated by meaning, can we advance to treating the real
methodical issues facing Catholic Studies.
In other words, in treating Catholic Studies, distinctions that have to be made between, for
example: generally recognized historical research; historical research that highlights conflicting
interpretations and historical accounts; theologically influenced accounts, explicitly theological
assertions and such assertions that would have an influence on public policy and action. Thus
the following questions can be asked about Catholic Studies:
1. Is Catholic Studies being done from a purely “historical” point of view?
2. or is it being done from a “dialectical” point of view that acknowledges the fundamental
differences between how scholars view historical data and acknowledges the need for
intellectual conversion?
3. Is Catholic Studies being done from a purely religious studies point of view that only
takes into account historical data? Or from a theological point of view that allows for
theological judgments and beliefs?
4. Does a normative point of view enter in to the doing of Catholic Studies? not just
outlining conflicting options but actually taking a stand among those options?
5. and does such a normative point of view take into account Catholic theology today? that
is doctrinal and systematic judgments?
6. Finally, is Catholic Studies explicitly concerned with contemporary issues and the
relevance of Catholicism to contemporary issues?
As the scholastic dictum would have it: sapientis est distinguere: it is characteristic of the
wise person to make distinctions. The above questions are distinct and they reflect distinctions
that should be made in order to have clarity of thought about reality and the issues outlined.
Method is a fluid reality precisely because it is the reality of our minds as they continually shift
gears and readjust in ever changing circumstances.15
As we mentioned, method gets us out of ourselves and into a community that can evaluate our
processes of discovery and set them out publicly for the benefit of future researchers. Such
methods are multiple, for they develop, differentiate, become integrated into larger wholes. They
reflect the characteristics writ large of the dynamic and creative characteristics of the individual
human mind.
[T]he consciousness of every scientist includes a consciousness of the proper
method of his subject. Just as the historian needs such a consciousness of
historical method, so too do physicists, chemists, biologists, psychologists,
exegetes, and so on, need to be effectively aware of the methodical exigencies of
their respective fields.16
When the word “method” is mentioned, many cultural commentators think of the natural
sciences with their overtones of rationalism and efforts at control. Many see an emphasis on
scientific method as denigrating more personal and humanist concerns. Even scientific method,
however, is rooted in the personal: that is, our human experience and our ability to question and
understand, to reflect and to make judgments on the basis of our understanding. In other words,
scientific method is just one expression of the basic method, the basic dynamic structure of the
human mind. Becoming aware of that basic dynamic structure and its extension into the various
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methods was the major focal point of Bernard Lonergan‟s work. Thus, in a 1972 article entitled
“The On-going Genesis of Methods” Lonergan reflected on the origins of the scientific method
and its extension into the many methods of the natural sciences, historical scholarship, and what
he there terms the methods of dialectic and praxis. This is a short-hand division for the great
varieties of methods that have emerged from the basic method that is the creative and dynamic
structure of the human spirit.
Where the Aristotelian placed his reliance on first principles he considered
necessary, the modern scientist places his reliance ultimately not on his basic laws
and principles but on his method. It was the method that brought forth the laws
and principles in the first place, and it will be the method that revises them if and
when the time for revision comes.17
This, of course, raises the question of relativism. If method can revise the principles and laws on
which a successful science has been constructed, so also, it would seem, methods are themselves
open to correction and revision. If methods too can be revised, then is not the whole of science
just “a vast structure resting upon sand?” Lonergan‟s response is that there is a basic method
built into the human spirit that is the basis of each of the special methods.
In brief, underpinning special methods there is what I have named generalized
empirical method. Its operations are the operations we can verify each in his own
consciousness. And the normative pattern that relates these operations to one
another is the conscious dynamism of sensitive spontaneity, of intelligence raising
questions and demanding satisfactory answers, of reasonableness insisting on
sufficient evidence before it can assent yet compelled to assent when sufficient
evidence is forthcoming, of conscience presiding over all and revealing to the
subject his authenticity or his unauthenticity as he observes or violates the
immanent norms of his own sensitivity, his own intelligence, his own
reasonableness, his own freedom and responsibility. 18
The basic refutation of relativism lies in following the innate dynamisms of the human spirit as it
steers a sane course between the Scylla of generalities and Charybdis of mere concreteness.
Such a method clearly grasps an unchanging dynamic structure immanent in developing subjects
that deal with changing situations in correspondingly changing manners.19 The wheel of human
consciousness rolls along progressively and issues into the various methods of the sciences and
scholarly disciplines. It is a wonderful process which each person can come to recognize and
appropriate in his or her own self. From such basic method, other methods develop and become
differentiated.
…the more a method is developed, the more it becomes specialized. In certain
areas its success is conspicuous, in others success is modest and even rare. In such
cases probably a different development of method is needed, and so where there
had been one more general method, now there are two more specialized methods.
In this fashion the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
was a general methodical breakthrough that since has divided and subdivided into
all the specialized branches of natural science. [footnote?]
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So we have the many developing and varied branches of the natural sciences as people “learn
more and more about less and less.” But a generalized empirical method can open questions that
are interdisciplinary – such as the relation of chemistry to biology or the relation of sociology to
history. It can also raise questions that go beyond the scope of empirical science as such. It can
raise the question of the validity of raising such questions. It can raise the question of the
consciousness of the scientist, the dynamism of awareness that leads her to discovery. It can
raise the question of authenticity: intellectual, moral, religious.
So there is always a “personal quotient” in scientific research. The history of science bears this
out as a positivist view of science originating in Galileo‟s view of atomistic and imaginable
objects “out there” gave way, after Einstein and Heisenberg, to an unimaginable world. The
criterion of truth and reality has moved from being what can be imagined as “already out there
now” to simply verifiable intelligibility. The ultimate criterion of reality is not found in the world
of immediacy but in the world mediated by meaning.
This methodological issue (meaning who IS the scientist?) continues to haunt practitioners of
science who either insist on an empiricist-reductionist view of science (a la Richard Dawkins) or
are open to a view of the deeper dimensions of the human person (a la Francis Collins, the
researcher of the human genome.) So the issue is one of development and conversion: of coming
to understand oneself correctly. It is the issue of coming to understand one‟s own understanding
correctly and thus coming to understand the world correlative to understanding as not just
material but as intelligible.
4. Historical Method
a. Methods develop in history – the genesis and ongoing development of…
b. History = understanding conflicting understandings of reality and history and
what is good and valuable in history
c. = what was going forward = what was good and what was bad, what was progress
and what was decline = authentic/unauthentic = research, interpretation and
history in a broad sense leads to evaluative history or what Lonergan in “Method
in Theology” calls “dialectic”
d. = history after the age of innocence =
e. = Ricoeur‟s hermeneutics of suspicion and hermeneutics of recovery
f. = Lonergan‟s own method in theology which includes not just dialectic but also
foundations, doctrines, systematics and communications –
Historical method involves a leap from the methods of the natural sciences to another kind of
method. For here we are studying, not nature, but rather the human constructions of the human
world. Such historical scholarship differs profoundly from natural science.
…when the scientist understands nature, he is not grasping nature‟s understanding
of itself; for though nature is intelligible, it is not intelligent. But when the
historian understands man, his understanding is a recapturing of man‟s understanding of himself.”(154)
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Now an emphasis on historical study is the basic cultural framework within which Catholic
Studies arose. For historical consciousness originally emerged as a cultural force in Germany in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when scholars initiated erudite historical studies of ancient
civilizations, studies that were rich in detail and were aware of pluralism, development and
diversity. It was quite a distinct kind of culture from the previous classicist culture which basically
saw itself as normative, the one authentic culture in relation to which all others were barbarians, the
unlettered, the children.20 Such scholars of history first produced detailed studies of ancient Greece
and Rome, then studies of early Christianity, and eventually historical studies of the Christian
Scriptures. Such studies challenged facile interpretations and eventually influenced Catholic
scholars and theologians. One of the first to incorporate such consciousness into Catholic thought
was John Henry Newman. As Lonergan once wrote, the new age in theology “dates not from 1965
when the second Vatican council closed, but rather from 1845 when Newman completed his
Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine.21”
Eventually such studies had an effect on the wider Catholic community. Emerging historical
studies revealed the vibrancy of the liturgy in early Christianity, and such studies contributed to the
modern liturgical movement. Concomitantly, Catholics came to a greater awareness of the
importance of the diverse local churches with their own unique and vibrant histories. Such, I take it,
is the origin of Fordham University‟s decision to focus its Catholic Studies program on American
Catholic history. The vibrancy of such historical studies was represented at the Fordham meeting
by young scholars writing on such topics as: “The Knights of Labor and Catholics vis a vis the
Minimum Wage Movement,” “Catholics, Communists and African Americans,” “Catholics and the
American Literary Canon,” “Catholics and the Waterfront: The Unionization of the New York
Waterfront,” etc. Similar studies could also be made on Catholic history in other countries, such as
“English Catholic Studies,” “Filipino Catholic Studies,” etc.
Such Catholic Studies can be seen to be a subsection of religious studies, that is, studies which
envisage all religions and, so far from endeavoring to arbitrate between opposing religious
convictions, commonly prefer to describe and understand their rituals and symbols, their origins and
distribution, their history and influence. (3 c 113-114)
Such historical studies have profoundly changed the face of Catholic theology. Where prior to
Vatican II, virtually all Catholic theology involved a scholastic or Thomistic framework, historical
study tended to relativize even the contribution of Aquinas. Since it counsels understanding an
author in the context of his times and not according to some author's polemical aims, such study
threatens facile interpretations.
When the study of Aquinas was enjoined on all students of philosophy and theology,
what was envisaged was the assimilation of the basic tenets of Thomistic
thought. But the first concern of historical scholarship is not to set forth and
convince readers or hearers of the profundity of an author's thought, the breadth of
his vision, the universal relevance of his conclusions. That sort of thing may be
allowed to pad a preface or to fill out a conclusion. But the heart of the matter is
elsewhere. It is a long journey through variant readings, shifts in vocabulary,
enriching perspectives - all duly documented - that establish as definitively as can be
expected what the great man thought on some minor topic within the horizon of his
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time and place and with no great relevance to other times and places. Only from a
long series of such dissertations can the full picture be constructed - a picture as
accurate as it is intricate, broad indeed but with endless detail, rich in implications
for other times if only one has the time to sort them out, discern the precise import of
each, and infer exactly what does and does not follow.22
So also in his Method in Theology Lonergan warns against the premature influence of
contemporary theological issues on historical research – to the detriment or deformation of the
latter. [Cf. Method in Theology]
Nevertheless, for most Catholics merely historical religious studies would not be sufficient to
encompass their understanding of Catholicism. Catholicism involves something more than a mere
historical cataloguing of what goes under the rubric of “Catholic.” Catholicism essentially involves
a personal commitment, a following of Christ as well as membership in the community of witness
and service that is the Church.[cf. Christology Today on the key to the NT = commitment] It is in
such commitment that Catholic theology is rooted and upon which it reflects.
Thus, John Henry Newman described the development of the Catholic intellectual tradition as it
made its way in history.
Prophets or Doctors are the interpreters of the Revelation; they unfold and define its
mysteries, they illuminate its documents, they harmonize its contents, they apply its
promises. Their teaching is a vast system, not to be comprised in a few sentences,
not to be embodied in one code or treatise, but consisting of a certain body of Truth,
pervading the Church like an atmosphere, irregular in its shape from its very
profusion and exuberance; at times separable only in idea from Episcopal Tradition,
yet at times melting away into fable and legend; partly written, partly unwritten,
partly the interpretation, partly the supplement of Scripture, partly preserved in
intellectual expressions, partly latent in the spirit and temper of Christians; poured to
and fro in closets and upon the housetops, in liturgies, in controversial works, in
obscure fragments, in sermons, in popular prejudices, in local customs. This I call
Prophetical Tradition, existing primarily in the bosom of the Church itself, and
recorded in such measure as Providence has determined in the writings of eminent
men. Keep that which is committed to thy charge, is St. Paul‟s injunction to
Timothy; and for this reason, because of its vastness and indefiniteness it is
especially exposed to corruption, if the Church fails in vigilance. This is that body
of teaching which is offered to all Christians even at the present day, though in
various forms and measures of truth, in different parts of Christendom, partly being
a comment, partly an addition upon the articles of the Creed. (Devel of C Doctrine)
According to Newman the “idea” that was Christianity and was at the basis of the Christian Church
gave that Church new strength as it came in contact with new cultures. In the midst of assimilating
all that was good in these cultures, it gradually defined its doctrines and martyrs witnessed to strong
religious commitment.
Thus Christianity grew in its proportions, gaining aliment and medicine from all that
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it came near, yet preserving its original type, from its perception and its love of what
had been revealed once for all and was no private imagination.
This was a developmental process demanding testing and discernment.
A conviction that truth was one; that it was a gift from without, sacred trust, etc....all
this is quite consistent with perplexity as to the truth in a particular case; Councils
and Popes are the guardians of the dogmatic principle, they are not that principle
themselves.
Gradually, in the life of the Church there occurred a thousand openings into new dimensions of the
truth. Even heresies were indications of gropings toward new dimesions of the truth. The conduct
of Popes, Councils, Fathers, betokens the slow, painful anxious taking up of new elements into an
existing body of beliefs. And characteristic of Doctors of the Church was a patient trying and retrying of the truth from every angle. In assimilating the usages and doctrines of new cultures the
Church gave them a new vitality in the light of grace: pagan usages were brought into the liturgy,
Greek philosophy was used in explaining the Gospel.
Because of that theologically grounded historians have not been afraid to reflect on “what was going
forward” in history: what constituted progress, what decline, what elements of redemption.
Now the demise of classicism and the rise of historical consciousness gave rise to the fear of
relativism in the Catholic church. This was the fear behind many involved in the modernist crisis in
the early twentieth century. This was the fear behind the minority voices in the Second Vatican
Council. This is a fear which greets a contemporary postmodern culture in which one never seems
to transcend one‟s historical embedded-ness. If there is no normative culture, is all merely relative?
Is there no truth which transcends one‟s own culture? Is there no possibility of transcending one‟s
own culture and speaking to persons of other cultures about common concerns? Is all relative to
particular cultural situations?
Christians have never believed that. They have believed that the Christian message could be
translated into other cultures - for “God wants all people to be saved.” And so for Christians there is
more than conflicting contexts: there is an enduring message and the communication of the Gospel
to others who are not of one‟s own native culture. Nevertheless, such an enduring message is always
formulated in the context of a particular culture. Today, much more aware of the diversity of
cultures, we are much more aware of how those cultures must be respected in the preaching of the
Good News.
Such communication presupposes that preachers and teachers enlarge their
horizons to include an accurate and intimate understanding of the culture and the
language of the people they address. They must grasp the virtual resources of that
culture and that language, and they must use those virtual resources creatively so that
the Christian message becomes, not disruptive of the culture, not an alien patch
superimposed upon it, but a line of development within the culture.23 (MT 13)
Now the methodological element Lonergan emphasizes is the element of conversion, that is, a
radical change of horizon. [define?] “It takes one to know one.” One will read history
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differently and one will communicate differently according to the presence or absence of
conversion. “It takes one to know one.” It takes a person of developed conscience to recognize
and acknowledge moral issues. It takes a religious person to understand religious texts. As Pascal
put it, “The heart has reasons that reason does not know.” It takes a morally converted person or
at least one who has a feeling for what that might mean to understand ethically challenging texts.
Intellectual conversion enters in with the need to move from inadequate and mythical
assumptions that fail to make distinctions to assumptions grounded in true judgments. For
example, are historical facts just “already out there” in a positivist way, or do they have to be
sought for, researched, understood, verified? One‟s “point of view” can determine the direction
of one‟s interest and the outcome of one‟s research. It can color one‟s results. One‟s personal
development, the presence or absence of conversion, can affect what one is open to and whether
one is open to the further question of God in human history. [cf. Robert Orsi]
Postmodernists would tend to emphasize the tentativeness and fallibilism of all interpretations
and historical studies. All are merely interpretations. They have a great distrust of le grand recit
– any overarching narrative. They tend to be unwilling to make definitive judgments; they are
allergic to saying what has been happening in history, “what was going forward.” But even
postmodernists, such as John Caputo in his book On Religion tends to tell a tale about what has
been going on - from antiquity to modernity to post-modernity – even though immediately
afterwards he also tries to tell you not to believe in it! [cf. his “On Religion”]
So why do history? Isn‟t something going on? Isn‟t something going forward? Obviously,
Christians believe there is a content to their faith – that God has revealed something of God‟s
own life to us – that we can live on the basis of knowledge-judgments God himself has shared
with us and have been passed on down the ages.
But, warned by postmodernists such as Caputo, this does not mean tribal loyalties and passions
that distort objectivity – and encourage violence – “us against them” prejudices. If it means
anything, it should show itself in loving service.
So certainly, one can distinguish between Catholic Studies tout cort, for example, in a secular
university where they tend to be subsumed under religious studies, and Catholic Studies within
an explicitly theological viewpoint. Most people surveying the history of religions and their
conflicts will want to know more than who held what about what topic when? They will want
more than “the play of interpretations.” They will want some judgment about what was going
forward and also about whether what was going forward was good or bad? – progress or decline?
a reflection of human authenticity or not?
Method of Dialectic
As we mentioned in the introduction to this paper, in the midst of our discussions at Fordham some
neuralgic or contentious questions arose,: questions such as “What do you mean by „Catholic?‟”
“Whose Catholicism are you talking about? Whites? Males? The middle class? Western? First
World? The Vatican‟s? the third world‟s? Catholic theologians? Dispassionate „outside‟ observers?
“Where do you draw the boundaries?” Some warned about the undue influence of one group or
another on the definition of what was meant by “Catholic.” Some were concerned that for some
Catholic Studies represented a retrenchment to a pre-Vatican II type of Catholicism. Others were
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concerned that an undue emphasis on “formation,” or spiritual formation in Catholic Studies
programs would detract from the intellectual rigor of such programs. One of the articles in the
present volume explicitly treats of “The Politics of Catholic Studies.” An article on Catholic Studies
noted:
[T]he significant link between Catholic and cultural studies invited dialogue on the
exclusionary tendency of models of “wholeness” – the often overlooked diversity of
Catholic life – and the habit of envisioning the Church from a European or EuroAmerican perspective. Who are the Catholics? This is the kind of question that
practitioners of cultural studies are inclined to ask. Catholic Studies might offer an
alternate way of recognizing the gifts brought to the church by women and by women
and men of color. (Fisher? )
All of this highlighted the issue of the context and personal horizon of the researchers, teachers,
administrators and others doing Catholic Studies. Is there a method that can take such personal
horizons seriously? For initial wonder unfolds in an orderly way as data gives way to interpretation
and the interpretation of various texts gives way to historical concerns about “what was going
forward.” Did it represent progress or decline? In what sense are we able to judge that bias was
present in past judgments?
It is one thing to do simple, direct research: consulting archives, supplying critical texts, going on
digs, etc. It is another thing again to hazard an interpretation of what Saint Paul actually meant by
“justification by faith.” It is still another to provide an historical account of “what was going
forward” between St. Paul and St. Augustine a few centuries later. And it is still another thing to
hazard an account of how the various positions of St. Paul, St. Augustine and Martin Luther are
reflected in contemporary conflicts. Lonergan calls this latter functional specialty dealing with
conflicting historical viewpoints or horizons “dialectic.”
By dialectic, then, is understood a generalized apologetic conducted in an
ecumenical spirit, aiming ultimately at a comprehensive viewpoint, and proceeding
towards that goal by acknowledging differences, seeking their grounds, real and
apparent, and eliminating superfluous oppositions.24
Such dialectical analysis involves the elements of comparison and criticism.
Now the study of these viewpoints takes one beyond the fact to the reasons for
conflict. Comparing them will bring to light just where differences are irreducible,
where they are complementary and could be brought together within a larger whole,
where finally they can be regarded as successive stages in a single process of
development. Besides comparison there is criticism. Not every view-point is
coherent, and those that are not can be invited to advance to a consistent position.
Not every reason is a sound reason, and Christianity has nothing to lose from a purge
of unsound reasons, of ad hoc explanations, of the stereotypes that body forth
suspicions, resentments, hatreds, malice. Not every irreducible difference is a serious
difference, and those that are not can be put in second or third or fourth place so that
attention, study, analysis can be devoted to differences that are serious and profound.
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So from a plurality of data, historical scholarship moves towards a dialectical unity, that is, a
comprehensive viewpoint that sets out the basic conflicting positions and counter-positions
bequeathed to us by the past. Thus, the dialectical oppositions involved in Catholic Studies will
include those between a totally secularist and reductionist view of Catholicism and on the other
hand “religious” views of Catholicism. But even among religious people there can be stark
differences of horizon between those who would interpret the past in a fundamentalist way and
those who, attributing proper value to historical scholarship, would take a more differentiated
approach. Even religious people are not exempt from materialist undertows, that is, materialist
interpretations of religious realities. [cf. E. I. Watkin on the materialism of religious people…]
It is here where concerns about “the politics of Catholic Studies” would come in; or concerns about
the inordinate role of “formation,” the reputedly moral or religious to the detriment of the
intellectual. On the other hand, there could rightly be concern for merely the intellectual without
taking into account the moral and religious.
[O]ur world is not utopia. Even if anyone manages to be perfectly authentic in all
his own personal performance, still he cannot but carry within himself the ballast of
his tradition. And down the millennia in which that tradition developed, one can
hardly exclude the possibility that unauthenticity has entered in and remained to
ferment the mass through the ages to come.
So one reaches what Lonergan calls “the end of the age of innocence, that age that assumed that
human authenticity could be taken for granted.
I do not mean that human wickedness was denied. But it felt it could be evaded.
Truth was supposed to consist in the necessary conclusions deduced from selfevident principles. Or it was that that reality was already out there now, and that
objectivity was the simple matter of taking a good look, seeing all that was there and
not seeing what was not there…
The end of the age of innocence means that authenticity is never to be taken for granted
…Human studies have to cope with the complexity that recognizes both (1) that the
data may be a mixed product of authenticity and of unauthenticity and (2) that the
very investigation of the data may be affected by the personal or inherited
unauthenticity of the investigators.
So we are back to “the personal quotient,” that is, the role of the development – or conversion of the
person in the such human studies as Catholic Studies.
The objective aspect of the problem has come to light in Paul Ricoeur‟s distinction
between a hermeneutic of recovery, that brings to light what is true and good, and a
hermeneutic of suspicion, that joins Marx in impugning the rich, or Nietzsche in
reviling the humble, or Freud in finding consciousness itself an unreliable witness to
our motives. (157)
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Answering all such questions leads us to recognize the role of our personal and communal
“horizon” on the unfolding of our human consciousness. By an horizon is meant the complexus of
experiences, understandings, judgments and decisions that have brought us to this point. Has my
journey or our journey to this moment been error-free? Were there moments of inattention in my
own personal development or in that of the community of which I am a member? Instances of
oversight that have remained? Of fundamental error and moral failure? Of bias and prejudice? Of
religious unauthenticity? Am I biased because I am a Catholic? Western? White? Does such bias
impact my reading of history? [this is good]
It is these questions that raise the issue of conversion. Coming to understand oneself as scientist or
scholar involves a conversion: a movement out of the darkness into the light. Just as the use of
mathematics in the natural sciences involved a kind of conversion, so understanding that
transformation constitutes an intellectual conversion.
But we are not only minds; we have hearts as well. The level of our moral and religious
development will profoundly influence us as well. And so we can ask: has there been an absence
of intellectual, moral and religious conversion? Have there been biases, screening memories,
legitimations, etc?
All these contribute to one‟s present horizon, how one views the world, the past and the future. It
is this element of horizon that will help us separate many of the pieces in the questions about
Catholic Studies with which we began this article.
All of which goes to emphasize the historically grounded character not only of religious studies, but
also of Catholic theology. If for many centuries Catholic theology was a classicist enterprise that
barely acknowledged historicity, cultural conditioning and development, particularity and diversity,
today in an historically conscious culture, these elements must be recognized and acknowledged.
Bernard Lonergan saw his whole vocation as a Catholic theologian as introducing history into
theology.
Functional Specialties in Theology
How to do that was the trick. Lonergan ultimately did it through his analysis of method in general
and theological method in particular as involving eight functional specialties. The first four of those
specialties regard the past as historical research gives way to interpretation and the history of “what
was going forward” in particular places and times and such historical analysis gives way to the
specialization of dialectic that analyzes the conflicts of historical positions and counter-positions
coming down to the present. Positions are the expressions of authentic thinking, living and loving;
and such positions contribute to historical development. Counter-positions, on the other hand,
reflect unauthentic thinking, living and loving and they reflect individual, social and cultural
decline. Eventually they invite their own reversal.
The specialties of research, interpretation, history and dialectic regard the past, that is, sorting out
the possible options bequeathed by the past to the present. But actually selecting an option,
personally appropriating one option from the past to develop, is a decision that orients one toward
the future. The study and objectification of such existential options is the arena of “foundations,”
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the first of the four specializations that regard the future. The others are doctrines expressing
judgments resulting from one‟s options, systematics that aims at articulating the kernel of the
message, and communications to the people of today. These eight functional specializations when
seen in a unity effect the introduction of history into theology in the following way:
Functional Specialties in Theology
Intellectual-Moral-Religious conversion
Hearing the Word
Dialectic
History
Interpretation
Research

Proclaiming the Word
[deciding]
[judging]
[understanding]
[experiencing]

Foundations
Doctrines
Systematics
Communications

Such functional specializations reflect the way our minds work when they operate well historically
and try to bring historical judgments into the contemporary situation. So with regard to Catholic
Studies the distinction between theology and religious studies is key. Is someone undertaking
Catholic Studies on the level of purely religious studies? Is one comparing the historical unfolding
of Catholicism to other religions and other elements in a society? Certainly a religious studies
approach is justified.
On the other hand, typically those studying Catholicism do so for religious reasons rooted in an
inner commitment. Their interest is neither purely historical nor comparative with other religions.
They have a sense that their religious symbols, beliefs and practices relate them, not just to others,
but to the beyond, specifically to God in Christ. They place their own history and human history in
general within a larger narrative of God‟s love for them in Christ. So James Fisher…
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5. Catholic Studies as Praxis
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

= what are you going to do about it?
Fisher
= the purification of the disciplines
Chesterton
The sacramental imagination
Aids the ancient practice of “discernment of spirits”
Experimental method reveals nature. Historical method reveals man, the selfcompleting animal, in the manifold variety of his concrete existing. Dialectic
confronts us with the problem of the irrational in human life and, as well, provides
a technique for distinguishing between authentic and unauthentic evaluations,
decisions, actions.
Praxis, finally, raises the final issue, What are you to do about it? What use are
you to make of your knowledge of nature, of your knowledge of man, of your
awareness of the radical conflict between man‟s aspiration to self-transcendence
and, on the other hand, the waywardness that may distort his traditional heritage
and even his own personal life. It is only after the age of innocence that praxis
becomes an academic subject.

In “The Ongoing Genesis of Methods” Lonergan states that after experimental, historical and
dialectical method, there is the method of “praxis” which asks the question, “what are you going to
do about it?” He locates the question in the context of “the end of innocence;” that is, when belief
in the omni-competence of scientific rationalism has lost its sway. It is only when the issue of a
personal authenticity deeper than scientific rationalism comes to the fore that praxis can become an
academic subject.
He describes the two-fold hermeneutic, a hermeneutic of suspicion as well as a hermeneutic of
recovery in which authenticity cannot be taken for granted. He argues that praxis is a distinct
method involving a compound of theoretical and practical judgments of value. (David Coghlan,
“Action Research as a Method of Prazis,” privately distributed, p. 3)
Now to ask whether theology is a praxis in this second sense, is…to ask a general
question and a rather technical one. It is to ask whether there are basic theological
questions whose solution depends on the personal development of theologians.
Again, to use a distinction made by Paul Ricoeur, it is to ask whether issues on
which theologians are badly divided call for the employment of both a hermeneutic
of suspicion and a hermeneutic of recovery, a hermeneutic of suspicion that
diagnoses failures in personal development and a hermeneutic of recovery that
generously recognizes the genuine personal development that did occur.6
Catholic Studies as Theological Communications
Communications is a major concern, for it is in this final stage that theological reflection bears fruit.
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Without the first seven stages, of course, there is no fruit to be borne. But without the last the first
seven are in vain, for they fail to mature.
Finally, as we link Catholic Studies both to religious cultural studies as well as to contemporary
Catholic theology, we would have to note that it would not seem that foundational, doctrinal and
systematic theology are the precise bailiwick of Catholic Studies. For from a specifically
theological point of view, it would seem that Catholic Studies would pertain especially to the
functional specialization of communications. In Method in Theology Lonergan does not give an
exhaustive description of communications precisely because communications is such a vast area.
Nevertheless, he does describe communications in such a way as to link it to systematic and
doctrinal theology on the one hand, and to all the other disciplines in the university on the other.
Communications is concerned with theology in its external relations. These are of
three kinds. There are interdisciplinary relations with art, language, literature, and
other religions, with the natural and the human sciences, with philosophy and
history. Further, there are the trans-positions that theological thought has to develop
if religion is to retain its identity and yet at the same time find access into the minds
and hearts of people of all cultures and classes. Finally, there are the adaptations
needed to make full and proper use of the diverse media of communication that are
available at any place and time.25
Let us list these relations of communications to the world “external” to theology:
1) Interdisciplinary relations with art, language, literature, and other religions, with the
natural and the human sciences, with philosophy and history.
2) The trans-positions that theological thought has to develop if religion is to retain its
identity and yet at the same time find access into the minds and hearts of men of all
cultures and classes.
3) The adaptations needed to make full and proper use of the diverse media of
communication that are available at any place and time.
Now while it is important to emphasize the fact that Lonergan considered all three of these areas of
communications as “theology,” still I would suggest that Catholic Studies as it is now emerging in
the academy has as its goal the interdisciplinary relations of theology with art, language, literature,
and other religions, with the natural and human sciences, with philosophy and history. Thus, in the
program in Catholic Studies that I am most familiar with at Seton Hall University there are courses
in Catholicism and Art, Catholicism and Literature, Catholic Social Teaching, Archaeology and
Christianity, Catholicism and Film, Catholicism and the Social Sciences, etc.
On the one hand, then, while Catholic Studies as communications is linked to systematic, doctrinal
and foundational theology - what we have traditionally called “theology” - on the other hand, it is
related externally to the disciplines where it can possibly play a dialectical, purifying and
transforming role. That is, it would seem to be a major goal of Catholic Studies as presently
emerging, to link the Catholic intellectual tradition with all the other disciplines, professions and
areas of contemporary culture and in that capacity exercising an “integrating” role in the academy,
bringing to it a certain integrating “wisdom.”
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Chesterton on arithmetic
Haughey talking to historian
The guy at ND on anthropology
Thus, in the last chapter of Method in Theology, the chapter on communications, Lonergan calls for
what he calls “integrating studies,” that is, interdisciplinary studies between Catholic theology and
the human sciences. One simple reason for the need for such integrating studies is that the human
sciences have something to offer theology, for theology illuminates only part of the human
condition.
[T]heology illuminates only certain aspects of human reality…the church can
become a fully conscious process of self-constitution only when theology unites
itself with all the other relevant branches of human studies.26
Modern history, then, along with religious studies, political science, economics, sociology and
psychology all tell us some very concrete things about the human person – things that we could not
know from theology alone. As such they pose questions to theology which theology would not
arrive at on its own. These are the questions posed to the Catholic intellectual tradition by the
researchers and thinkers of our day. Catholic Studies as communications can then act as a bridge
feeding back into systematic, doctrinal, foundational and historical theology the new questions
arising among people of today that can bring to light new aspects of the deposit of faith.
At the same time, the bridge goes both ways, and Catholic Studies can bring all the resources of the
Catholic intellectual tradition to bear on all of what we are seeking to understand about what it
means to be human today. How can theology do this? What relevance does Catholic Studies have
for the concerns of other disciplines? What aid can it bring towards a solution of their problems? It
is impossible to answer this question in detail, but I would indicate a relevance of theology to a
basic problem in the human sciences. For theology done well is not materialist or reductionist. On
the other hand, to quote Lonergan:
…the human sciences may be and often are pursued simply on the analogy of the
natural sciences. When this is done rigorously, when it is contended that a scientific
explanation of human behavior is reached if the same behavior can be had in a robot,
then everything specifically human disappears from the science. The human science
becomes exact by ceasing to treat of man as he is. On the other hand, when human
scientists reject such reductionism, and many do, not only does the exactitude of the
natural sciences vanish but also the human sciences risk becoming captives of some
philosophy. For what the reductionist omits are the meaning and value that inform
human living and acting. 27
Clarifying the meaning of meaning and value is the point of a foundational methodology that insists
on asking the question, “What am I doing when I am doing it?” What am I doing when I am
writing this article? What am I doing as I am trying to understand it? Catholic theology has long
been used to dealing with such questions of meaning and value - from the Fathers of the Church
who invoked Plato, to Aquinas who invoked Aristotle, to the interiorly focused and personalist
philosophies of today. In all, the category of “meaning” is central - along with the concomitant
categories of knowing, objectivity and reality. And because Catholic theology tends to be at home
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with these categories, it can handle not only questions about the development of Catholic doctrine,
but it can also handle questions about the meanings and values emerging from the practice of the
natural sciences. For
…not even the natural sciences can prescind from the question of value, for the very
pursuit of a value, and the contention that science should be value-free, wertfrei, if
taken literally, implies that science should be worthless.28
And just as there are radically divergent interpretations of modern science, empiricist, idealist and
realist, so such foundational positions enter into the interpretation of human history. Even the
question, “What are historical facts?” can be answered in an empiricist, an idealist or a realist way.
For the empiricist they are what was out there and was capable of being looked at.
For the idealist they are mental constructions carefully based on data recorded in
documents. For the critical realist they are events in the world mediated by true acts
of meaning.
In other words, an understanding of the foundational methodology of the human spirit is needed to
understand the very meaning of human history and the human sciences.
In addition, Catholic theology and Catholic Studies has something very important to bring to the all
the humanities. For the humanities deal with the human person in the widest sense and the widest
sense includes not only human frailty and sinfulness, but also the healing and elevating love of God.
Such a love is the basic fulfillment of human person. Such a love, united to an adequate and deeply
personal methodology, can free the disciplines from a materialistic undertow and aid our religious
love of the world. An adequate methodology can help us to hear the Word of God coming to us out
of the conflicts of the past and speak that Word in today‟s world. An adequate methodology can
help us truly encounter the past.
In brief, the first phase of theology is incomplete, if it is restricted to research,
interpretation, and history. For as we have conceived these functional specialties,
they approach but do not achieve an encounter with the past. They make the data
available, they clarify what was meant, they narrate what occurred. Encounter is
more. It is meeting persons, appreciating the values they represent, criticizing their
defects, and allowing one's living to be challenged at its very roots by their words
and by their deeds. Moreover, such an encounter is not just an optional addition to
interpretation and to history. Interpretation depends on one's self-understanding; the
history one writes depends on one's horizon; and encounter is the one way in which
self-understanding and horizon can be put to the test.29
Such an authentic encounter with key figures from the Catholic Christian path can prepare us to
truly encounter the thinkers of the various disciplines of our own age. And just as in such an
encounter we can learn from them, perhaps through Catholic theology and Catholic Studies they can
begin to hear something of the Good News from us.
Catholic Studies and the Catholic Imagination
In addition, when Catholic Studies are talked about, there often arise questions of what is called “the
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Catholic imagination” or “the sacramental imagination” or “the analogical imagination.” These
expressions highlight the relationship of Catholicism to the humanities, literature and the arts. Here
it is sometimes claimed that there can be discerned a specific character in the works of Catholic
writers, a certain kind of “earthiness,” a specific way of using myth and symbol, a certain spirit
infusing works of literature and art, and even film.30 Certainly such discernment can be contested
and in a pluralistic culture alternative accounts can be given. We are faced with the fact that even
the interpretation of historical works involves, besides accepted academic competency, levels of
self-knowledge that infuse any interpretation. Should one say one‟s “theology?” One‟s personal
horizon is important and there is no way around it.
In addition, there could be from a Catholic viewpoint a very capacious way of evaluating what is
“Catholic.” Indeed, in the light of Catholic faith everything can be seen as “religious” – even math
and physics. As G.K. Chesterton once wrote on the reason for Catholic schools:
There is a Catholic view of learning the alphabet; for instance it prevents you from
thinking that the only thing that matters is learning the alphabet; or from despising
better people than yourself, if they do not happen to have learned the alphabet. I am
only pointing out that every education teaches a philosophy if not by dogma than by
suggestion, by implication, by atmosphere.” 31
6. Conclusion: Catholic Studies as Wisdom
a. It is the element of concomitant wisdom that accompanies all one does = one‟s
knowledge of what one is doing when one is doing it and how what one is doing
fits into the “whole” of reality
b. So one needs a heuristic sense of what “the whole” consists in – even a theoretical
understanding c. It is what Newman would call the philosophical habit of mind and St. Thomas
Aquinas would call natural wisdom
The functional specialization of dialectic has as its aim the lining up and contrasting of various
conflicting horizons, but any determination of where one stands with regard to those conflicts will
come from a very personal source, what Lonergan calls “conversion.” For Lonergan conversion is a
more than simple personal development: it is a change or transformation of the person "for the
better:"
It is not merely a change or development; rather, it is a radical transformation on
which follows, on all levels of living, an interlocked series of changes and
developments. What hitherto was unnoticed becomes vivid and present. What has
been of no concern becomes a matter of high import. So great a change in one‟s
apprehensions and one‟s values accompanies no less a change in oneself, in one‟s
relations to other persons, and in one‟s relations to God.
Such personal conversion, which Lonergan specifies as intellectual, moral and religious, has its
social and historical ramifications.
Conversion is existential, intensely personal, utterly intimate. But it is not so private
as to be solitary. It can happen to many, and they can form a community to sustain
one another in their self-transformation and to help one another in working out the
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implications and fulfilling the promise of their new life. Finally, what can become
communal, can become historical. It can pass from generation to generation. It can
spread from one cultural milieu to another. It can adapt to changing circumstances,
confront new situations, survive into a different age, flourish in another period or
epoch. (MT 130-131)
When conversion is viewed as an ongoing process, at once personal, communal, and historical, it
coincides with living religion. For religion is conversion in its preparation, in its occurrence, in its
development, in its consequents, and also, alas, in its incompleteness, its failures, its breakdowns, its
disintegration.
Now theology, and especially the empirical theology of today, is reflection on
religion. It follows that theology will be reflection on conversion. But conversion is
fundamental to religion. It follows that reflection on conversion can supply theology
with its foundation and, indeed, with a foundation that is concrete, dynamic,
personal, communal, and historical
(“Theology in its New Context,” A Second Collection (University of Toronto
Press, 1996), 65-67.
And so contentment with classifying Catholic Studies as purely religious studies would not be
satisfactory for many persons grounded in the Catholic theological tradition. For although religious
studies envisages all religions, theologies tend to be as many and diverse as the religious convictions
they express and represent. “Mere history is not theology,” and ecumenical inter-religious dialogue
can only fruitfully take place among those who know themselves and their own tradition. Clarifying
this distinction between religious studies and theology, Lonergan writes:
It is the singularity of religious symbols that gives rise to the distinction between
religious studies and theology. For religious studies leave to theology questions
concerned with what is believed to be more than man, what is not of this world.
They confine their attention, as does the whole of modern science, to what is within
this world, to the things man experiences, and even to human experiencing itself.
Nor is there any doubt in my opinion, about the general soundness of this
restriction... 32
On the other hand, fruitful theology must be based on accurate history, but history alone is not
theology.
The theologies endeavor to discern whether there is any real fire behind the
smoke of symbols employed in this or that religion.33
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